




























































































FinlandFeb．19932％ Underlyi㎎bPI IndefhliteCB No
New　ZealandM r．19900～3％ CPI IndefiniteJointly　byfov．　and　CBY6s
Spain Nov．19942％ CPI lyear CB Y6s
SwedenJan．玉9931～3％ CPI IndefiniteCB Yεs
United
jingdomOct．19922．50％ RPIX IndefiniteGov， Y6s












































































































































































一20．46（1153） 1．32（1，38） 一〇．04（17．41） 一2，67（3．64） 一3．19（3．74）
Note）　O　is　p　yalue．　Log　oflikelihood　：　一5，00
The　result　is　almost　as　expected．
　　The　coefficient　ofinfiation　targeting　is　minus　as　expected，　however，　it　is　not　significant
against　inflation　targeting　in　the　EU．　ln　the　EU，　inflations　rate　had　been　decreasing．　The
main　reason　for　this　is　currency　integration．　Suppressing　inflation　rate　is　one　condition
for　currency　integration．　ln　1990　the　infiation　rate　had　been　decreasing　rapidly．　On　the
other　hand，　the　OECD　coyntries’　coefficient　to　inflatidn　targeting　is　1arger　than　the　EU’s
one．　However，　it　is　not　also　sigriificant．
　　The　coefficient　ofopenness　of　the　economy　against　infiation　targeting　is　as　expected．
The　coefficient　is　minus　and　significapt：　The　absolute　value　of　EU　is　larger　than　the
OECD’s　one．　This　is　due　to　the　large　degree　ofopenness　ofthe　economy　in　the　EU．
　　The　independent　ofcentral　banks　affects　on　minus　influence　on　adopting　inflation　tar－
geting．　The　coefficient　of　fiscal　surplus　is　also　minus　as　expected．
　　The　ECB　have　decided　to　watch　both　inflation　targeting　and　money　supply　at　least　for
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the　time　being．　The　main　point　of　the　ECB　strategy　of　monetary　policy　is　to　announce
the　reference　value　ofa　quantitative　definition　ofinflation　and　money　supply．　For　infla－
tion　rat’e，　the　ECB　set　HICP　（Harmonized　lndex　of　Consumer　Prices）　and　it　must　be
within　20／o　to　the　previous　year．　For　money　supply，　the　ECB　also　set　the　reference　rate．
The　reference　value　of　the　ratio　to　the　previous　year　＋4．50／o　is　set，　and　money　supply　is
monitored　by　comparison　with　the　three　months　moving　average　in　the　previous　．year　of
M3．　EU　countries　had　adopted　different　monetary　policy　strategies，　so　adopting　two
monetary　strategigs　at　the　sarne　time　would　be　better．　Ofcourse　this　policy　would　be　re－
made　depending　on　future　economic　conditions．
4．　Conclusions
　　This　paper　analyzed　the　merits　and　demerits　ofinflation　targeting．　The　reasons　for
adopting　inflation　targeting　in　the　EU　was　not　attributed　to　past　inflation　rates．
Additionally，　it　was　confirmed　that　the　openness　of　the　economy，　independence　of
the　central　bank，　and　fiscal　surplus　were　minus　factors　of　inflation　targeting．　However，
the　necessity　for　hurrying　to　adopt　inflation　targeting　could　not　be　found．　ln　the　EU　the
fimdamentals　of　the　economy　are　not　so　good．　The　Euro　has　just　started，　and　the　one
like　’real　exchange　rate　targeting’　may　be　suitable　so　as　not　to　change　the　real　exchange
rate．　Globalization’s　progress　is　one　reason．　To　achieve　this，　the　infiation　rate　is　adjusted
to　make　the　real　exchange　rate　stable．　Adopting　inflation　targeting　conflicts　with　political
interests　and　the　inflation　rate　in　the　EU　is　not　so　high．　And　each　country　has　nervous
for　interests　of　it’s　own．　However，　money　suppiy　targeting　is　also　difficult．　ln　the　EU
or　the　participating　countries　ofthe　Euro，　all　couritries　cannot　grasp　the　functions　ofmoney
demand　and　money　supply　immediately　and　accurately．　Nowadays　imancial　innovations
are　ongoing　and　the　traditional　money　supply　has　to　be　changed，　Moreover，　when　money
supply　is　made　a　target，　higher　preparation　rate　is　often　imposed．　Banks　would　not　like
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it．　However，　data　is　being　gathered　comparatively　promptly　and　accurately　in　recent
years．　Therefore，　ifcentral　banks　stick　to　the　money　supply，　it　would　be　better　to　treat
it　not　as　the　middle　target　but　one　ofpolicy　strategy．
　　Let’s　go　baek　to　inflation　targeting　again．　Several　criticisms　eXist　against　infiation
targeting．　The　first　one　is　that　inflation　does　not　stop．　To　avoid　this，　central　banks　should
clearly　set　the　targets，　and　maintain　the　independence．　For　central　bank’s　independence，
central　banks　should　not　undertake　national　debt　against　their　will　because　of　political
pressure，　for　example．　Secondly，　there　is　a　problem　that　correct　information　is　given　to
the　forecast　inflation　rate，　too．　This　might　be　a　problem　ofcredibility　to　what　extent　the
independence　ofthe　central　bank　obtains．　Thirdly，　some　worry　that　a　long－term　interest
rate　may　rise．　Ifthe　central　banks　can　maintain　their　independence．@and丘scal　dicipline，
there　should　be　no　problem’．　Even　ifinfiation　targeting　is　adopted，　consideration　from
another　country　might　be　needed　in　the　country　that　suffers　from　a　liquidity　trap　and
deflation．　Japan　is　typical　example．　Policy　makers・　should　take　these　specific　circumstances
Mto　account．
　　Moreover，　above　all，　theoretical　analysis　is　necessary　from　the　point　ofview　ofpolicy
rule，　above　all．　Rogoff　（1985），　Walsh　（1998），　Cecchetti　（2000），　Clarida　et　al．　（1999），
Svensson　and　Woodford　（1999），　Svensson　（2002）．　Or　Taylor　rue　is　also　highlighted．
However，　I　want　to　do　with　these　problems　in　another　oppo血mity．
Footnote
l．The　instability　of　prices　invites　groWth，　that　is　veri丘ed　theoretically　and　empirically．
2．　Refer　to　Taylor　（1979），　Fountas，　Karanasos，　Eurid　the　and　Kim　（2002），　etc．
3．　ln　the　1arger　sense，　inflation　targeting　puts　weight　on　inflation　forecasting，　production　or　production
　gap，　and　transparency　or　explanation　power　of　central　banks，　other　than　inflation　itself．　Refer　to
　Svensson　（2002）　foT　details．
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4．　Countries　other　than　those　listed　in　Table　1　are　the　Czech　Republic，　lsrael，　South　Korea，　Mexico，
　　New　Zealand，　Peru，　Potand，　South　Africa，　Switzerland，　and　Thailand．
5．Kahn　and　Parrish（1998）says　Australia，　Canada，　Chile，　F血land，　Israel，　New　Zealand，　Spain，　and
　　Sweden　have　been　enumerated　as　having　adopted　inflation　targeting．
6．　This　paper　adds　three　countries　（Denmark，　Sweden，　United　Kingdom）　that　did　notjoin　the　currency
　　integration．
7．　Finally，　arbitrary　ofthe　authorities　，and　probl．em　ofthe　decision　person　exists　and　these　problems　are
　　difficult　whether　they　are　solved　or　not，　Good　financial　policies　depend　on　central　banks　and　the
government．
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